di
Federico Salvati
(federicoslvt@gmail.com)
Water is a
vital for human life but not everywhere
this essential asset is abundant. For this reason, sadly, many community are
force to administrate the water in order to maximize the utility and to not
squander the already scarce asset. Water management is one of the main
strategical issues of our times. In some regions like central Asia or North
Africa the topic affect the daily life
of millions of people in a scenario where the human life is still irremediably
bound to the geographical datum. When the resource is shared by tow or more
state the situation can rise strategic competition and water management become
even a more thorny argument. A shared river basin at the same time can be
source of fierce wars or steady cooperation. In order to analyze the scenario
we can use a game theory approach. This perspective allows us to conceptualize
main interests and their related behavior forecasting probable outcomes and
choices. The big flaw of this approach is that we assume the actors to be
completely rational. Many aspects which belong to the cultural or the social-
anthropological sphere are not taken in account, even though empirically they
can have a major influence depending by the case. Furthermore in many analysis
it is not clear upon what basis the pay-offs of the games calculated. This can
create arbitrary assumption that can affect the analysis from its very basics.
Theoretically speaking anyway hardly social science has found an as valid
approach as game theory is. According to such analysis the central focus has to
be posed on externalities problems. When an upstream country decide to use a
transboundary river course it creates externalities for the downstream state
manipulating either the quality and the quantity of the resource. Seen the premises
the fallowing question now is to explain how and if these externalities can be
internalized and what would be the consequences of the different available
strategies. Non- cooperative game models for this specific scenario seem to fit
pretty well. According to non- cooperative game theory the parties are engaged
in a competitive strategic relation. They will try to maximize their behaviour
by choosing their strategies. The players are interconnected and: every
decision of one party will affect possibility and strategy of the other. Non
-cooperative strategy (E.G. prisoner dilemma strategy) tends to not generate
cooperation between the parties, since the risk of been exploited is too high.
In a classical non cooperative game the players will go for a non cooperative
strategy which is strictly dominant on the cooperative one, reaching so their
Nash equilibrium.
FIG. 1 Classical
prisoner dilemma
COOP EXPLOIT
1
 1 |
3
-3
|
||
-3
3
|
0
0
|
We can recognize in
this game the classical prisoner dilemma structure.
A general solution
for the prisoner dilemma is to repeat the single game. The repetition makes
rationally a better strategy to cooperate since it is the only manner to
maximize the pay-off. The equilibrium in the long term can differ from the
equilibrium in the subgame. Fundamental assumption remains that such repetition
(as in the case of transboundary river management ) it doesn't have and end
game. In the opposite case a strict domination for the non-cooperation strategy
would be recreated in the endgame and cooperation will fail. Another important
circumstance to analyze is the possibility for the down stream country to
improve its bargain power by linking different issues together. In this case
the new equilibrium for the game would be found in a mixed matrix interlinking
all the issues. In the shared river basin scenario we can easily an bright
example of it. The upstream country acting unilaterally in the river
exploitation can generate a security dilemma-like situation. By increasing its
welfare the upstream country will decease the downstream one. This will
generate instability and insecurity, creating border troubles and problems
akin. Bluntly put if we deprive the downstream country of all the water
indirectly we will generate a security problem between the tow actors. In the
mixed game example the upstream and the downstream country can find new
equilibrium, choosing a strategy more profitable for both actors. More simply
reworded by giving up a bit in one issue they will receive an upper pay-off
gaining more from the other .
fig. 2 mixed game
coop coop explo explo
instability secu secu instability
  5
2
|
-1
3
|
1
2.5
|
-5
3.5
|
6
0
|
4
3
|
2
0.5
|
-2
1.5
|
4
0
|
-2
1
|
3
1
|
-3
2
|
5
-2
|
1
1
|
4
-1
|
0
0
|
The possibility to
find a better solution to the game by multiplying interests is backed up also
by another game theory feature. We assume usually that a government has more
targets than means to achieve them. They have therefore to trade-off in order
to achieve what they can, with what they have. This will make coordination more
likely to happen and more important. This kind of thinking brings up more
questions then answers. For example we can discuss about what is the extent of the
trade off or what are the endogenous mechanisms that push the decision-makers
to stand for a specific goal. Anyway one think certainly remains: the actors in
a regional environment if they have a trade-off situation (like water-security
), they can have higher out-comes when they cooperate. Such a situation has
found vast proof (analytically and empirically) thanks to the works of
economists like Hamada, Ghosh and Masson.
Fig 3 cooperation
game
EXPLOIT COOP
  0
0
|
0
0
|
0
0
|
1
1
|
Under this
prospective we can use a different kind of approach to describe the problem.
Let us assume in this case the existence of a cooperative game. According to
the cooperative game theory the members
will have to seek coordination. The pay-off are more higher when the parties
coordinate. If they don't do so they will face added costs or simply lower out-
comes. In the water management case this is clearly relevant. Thinking our case
in a dynamic perspective, according to the perspective of a cooperative game
there is an astounding result. In fact by cooperating the cost faced by one of
the parties in a specific field will yield an increase of utility over the fact
per se. Generation of positive externalities will produce a snowballing effect
where the action will have a final utility which comprehends at the same time
the value per se of the action plus the avoidance of further problem creation.
In our specific case for instance we can present as a case in point security
issues. If the upstream country pumped all the water for its purposes, the
downstream country would be left without the wherewithal for feeding the
population. This would generate a commitment problem. The downstream country
has to take control of the river basin because otherwise the population will
starve to death. By finding an efficient mean to prevent starvation of the downstream
country the upstream country could have, for instance, electricity production,
plus the prevention of a military attack. As we said in the introduction game
theory is not a perfect tool of analysis. Models are just a exemplification of
real life but we can hardly find a similar tool that give as such a challenging
frame for setting our reasoning
(geografia2013@libero.it)
Nessun commento:
Posta un commento